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Visual Pleasure: Photography, Illusion and the Desire to be Deceived 
 
All of the artwork I have created over the last ten years has contained two unifying 
features; the use of photographic cut-out's and the use of my body. Both elements 
invoke philosophical questions about perception, interpretation and semiotics. The 
body of work printed in this book forms an enquiry into the act of looking, and the 
experiences we have as individuals when we are looked at. Both acts contain elements 
of construction; information that is created mentally rather than viewed by the eye 
and the codes of cultural viewing that idealise bodies and mould behaviours. There is 
always a disjuncture between the actual object and the object of our perception. This 
essay explores the artificiality of the way we see and the things we are shown. 
Consideration is given to the importance of the body, not only as an object of sight and 
a cultural signifier, but also as the vessel through which we negotiate the world and 
gather our perceptions of it. 
 
Throughout the middle ages philosophers considered the human subject in terms of 
two separate components - the body and the mind. Cartesian dualism decreed that 
vision inhabits consciousness and is given privilege over our tactile, bodily sensations. 
The body was only a container of consciousness – a vessel to transport the mind. In 
the early twentieth century  phenomenologists challenged this viewpoint, arguing that 
consciousness is not distinct from the body, but is created in it through touch, taste, 
smell, sound and sight. Rather than endow visual perception with a greater truth, they 
argued that vision alone was inadequate to understand the world. This is the 
philosophical viewpoint that I will go on to describe in relation to my artwork. 
 
It is our proximity to the physical world that allows us to make sense of our visual 
perceptions. As children we used our hands to learn how a shape felt, and then 
memorized the visual pattern that corresponded to the tactile sensation. We used 
memory and knowledge to invest new two-dimensional information with three-
dimensional attributes based on their similarity to the shapes we have learnt about 
previously. Even if we had never held an apple before we first looked at a photograph 
of one, we would be able to assign certain attributes to it that we had learned to 
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associate with the general idea of spherical objects through our previous tactile 
investigations. Inversely, if we hadn't already had an experience of holding a round 
object we would not be able to invest the apple with the correct three-dimensional 
form – we might imagine that it was flat or conical because our minds would not be 
able to fill in the information that was missing from the photograph. The side of the 
apple that was not revealed to the lens would be a void in the mind.  
 
We have to know an object physically before we are able to recognize it visually. Long 
before phenomenological philosophy, the empiricists were aware that visual 
information could be misconstrued if it was not corroborated by other types of 
information. They made the distinction between two types of objects – the visible 
object and the tangible object. The tangible object was something that could be 
measured and described in terms of those measurements – it had length, height, 
weight and density that did not change (or changed in a way that could also be 
measured, such as water turning into ice at 0°). Through experimentation and a 
corporeal propinquity to the object an agreed truth about its characteristics could be 
achieved. The visible object, however, was not to be trusted; it could alter its 
appearance and deceive. In 1709 George Berkeley published his Essay towards a New 
Theory of Vision, in which he described how a tangible object is always the same size 
and shape no matter where it is in relation to the observer – its dimensions remain the 
same even if the object is very close or at a great distance from the subject. But the 
visible object changes as you walk towards it or around it – it is not fixed to one visual 
form and cannot be measured because its shape and dimensions constantly 
transform.1 
 
In my artwork the cut-out is literally a visible object. From the angle that I photograph 
it, it appears to be a woman (The Substitute series), but if the viewer were able to 
change their position in relation to the cut-out, its dimensions would alter 
dramatically. It would transform from a life-sized human being into an abstract, 2-
dimensional object that doesn’t signify a body at all. But the viewer isn’t able to move 
around the cut-out; because he or she is given the correct visual information to lead 
the brain to the hypothesis of 'human being' they invest the visible object with the 
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attributes of the tangible object. The perspective of the camera withholds any 
information that would counter this assumption.  
 
The camera also defines the distance between the viewer and the cut-out. In some of 
the artwork the cut-out is in the foreground of the image, making its material qualities 
easier to discern and more tangible to the viewer. The cut-outs are at their most 
convincing when there is a considerable distance between the camera/viewer and the 
object. All tangible access to the cut-out is denied by the distance. The viewer makes 
his or her interpretation from indistinct visual information that indicates a human 
form rather than substantial information that indicates a photographic copy.  
 
Misinterpretations of visual information are possible because the information 
gathered in the eye is extremely limited; the vision we have of reality is largely created 
in the mind. According to Richard Gregory, a Professor in Neuropsychology, the 
amount of available information collected in the retina is likened to looking up at the 
night sky and only seeing an area the size of the moon – the rest of the visual data we 
believe we see is not collected by the eye but filled in by the brain using knowledge 
and memory. “Knowledge and assumptions add so much that vision is not directly 
related to the eyes’ images or limited by them - so quite often produces fictions”.2 To 
fill in the gaps in our perceptions we use “predictive-hypotheses of the external world 
of objects”3 that are projected onto the visual data collected by the retina to create 
“our most immediate reality… so experience is but indirectly related to external 
reality”.4  
 
If there are two likely predictive hypotheses of a scenario the brain ‘flips’ between the 
two outcomes. This is most simply demonstrated by visual illusions – such as the well 
known image of the old woman with a large nose that transforms into a young woman 
in a hat.5 We are only able to make one interpretation of the visual information at a 
time – if we see the old woman we are not able to see the young woman and vice 
versa. In my artwork I hope this flipping between readings also occurs; I want the 
viewer to initially hypothesize that they are looking at a body and then change the 
interpretation to photographic cut-out, once more detailed visual information has 
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been gathered. But unlike the audience of the 'old woman' illusion, the viewer of my 
artwork will not be able to flip back to the first reading once the cut-out has been 
exposed; the old woman is still present in the image when the young woman is 
revealed, but my body was never present in the image – the revelation of the cut-out 
confirms the absence of the real body. The second reading of the illusion annihilates 
the first reading and it can’t be resurrected. 
 
In my video piece, Interloper, I attempt to recreate the process of interpretation and 
reinterpretation that takes place as we gather visual information. Whilst watching the 
video, the spectator inhabits the voyeuristic view of the camera. The subject appears 
to be naked and is standing in a bathroom; the private nature of the location 
heightens the sense of intrusion and allows the woman to look at herself in a mirror, 
seemingly unaware that she is also the object of someone else's sight. The changing 
position of the camera transforms the subject from a visible object into a tangible 
object as the blank underside of the cut-out is revealed in the mirror. The material 
information that is usually hidden in my photographs is slowly revealed to the 
spectator and the original interpretation of the scene collapses. The implication of the 
visual data is reinterpreted and a new meaning is created. The spectator also 
undergoes a transformation from voyeur to fetishist as the naked body is revealed to 
be an inanimate object. 
 
The illusion of the cut-out is exposed by the cameras proximity to it. When given a 
fixed viewpoint the cut-out adequately signifies a naked torso, but by physically 
moving around the subject the viewer is able to collect additional information and 
conclude the interpretation accurately.   
 
In The Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty suggested that although our 
binocular vision allows us to see three-dimensionally we are still only able to see from 
one view-point, and so much of the three-dimensional world is hidden from our view. 
He described how he looked at a lamp on a table next to a wall. Although he could 
only see the part of the lamp that was facing him he knew that it was a three-
dimensional object because he imagined seeing the lamp from the perspective of the 
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table underneath it, and the wall behind it. Using his prior knowledge of three-
dimensional objects he filled-in the void contained within the act of looking; “[the] 
completed object is translucent, being shot through from all sides by an infinite 
number of present scrutinies which intersect in its depths leaving nothing hidden”.6   
 
The world is incomplete to our eyes, and it is necessary for the brain to project 
information onto objects to make them appear whole. This act of projection is 
exemplified in the relationship between a photograph and its viewer. When we look at 
a photograph we are given limited visual information. The two-dimensional plane of 
the photograph is coded to imply the presence of three-dimensional objects, even 
though it could not possibly contain them. In a photograph we are given a single point 
perspective, like Merleau-Ponty perceiving the lamp on his table. However, if he had 
wanted to test his imagined lines of perception he could walk over to the lamp, pick it 
up and view it from all angles, confirming what his mind had fabricated. His proximity 
to the object enabled him to elevate the visible object to the status of the tangible 
object. But the photograph has no substance; it is merely a copy of the visible object. 
When we look at a photograph we believe in the three-dimensionality of the object, 
but if we tried to see the other side we would be confronted by the blank underside of 
the photograph. In Interloper the mirror behind the cut-out and the movement of the 
camera fill in the 'infinite number of present scrutinies' and reveal the 
representational void. 
 
The Substitute series also contains this void – in some of the photographs the cut-outs 
are easily discernible, because the rippled edge of the paper or blank underside of the 
image is on display. These features function to disrupt the projected angles of 
perception for the viewer – the cut-out refuses to become translucent because it is so 
obviously two-dimensional.  
 
Believing is Seeing 
Photographic representation is usually so realistic and life-like that it is possible to 
forget to comprehend the material of its two-dimensional surface, and instead look 
straight through it to the object it implies. Representational art in any medium aims to 
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allow the viewer to see through the material substance of the artwork and be taken in 
by the illusion set before them. This isn’t a modern approach to art – Pliny made 
reference to it in Natural History xxxv in the 1st Century AD. He described how two 
painters, Parrhasius and Zeuxis, competed against each other to create the most 
realistic looking painting. Zeuxis painted a picture of a bunch of grapes which was so 
realistic that hungry birds were tricked by the image and flew to the painting.  Feeling 
satisfied with his work he challenged Parrhasius to open the curtain and reveal his 
great work. And there lay his mistake. Parrhasius had painted such a realistic depiction 
of a curtain that he had deceived Zeuxis, who in turn had only succeeded in deceiving 
dumb beasts. Zeuxis conceded defeat.7 
 
We are susceptible to the power of illusions because our perception of the world is a 
combination of visual data and expectation. We assume that we will see the things we 
usually see, and if our eyes are not presented with anything which is obviously 
contrary to this assumption we do not look any closer. Illusions are only successful 
because we abbreviate the process of looking. Zeuxis expected there to be a curtain 
behind which Parrhasiuses masterpiece would hang until the moment he revealed it. 
Had it been unusual to present a painting in this way he might have looked closer and 
exposed the trick.  
 
The viewer of a photograph is even more susceptible to this sort of illusion because 
there is an expectation that the camera is an objective recording device that renders a 
replica copy of the scene before the lens. Unlike a painting, the photograph 
intrinsically contains “the reality of its origin”;8 it is “not the optionally real thing to 
which an image or sign refers but the necessarily real thing which has been placed 
before the lens, without which there would be no photograph”.9 
 
It is highly likely that this will also be the assumption when people view The Substitute 
series. The figure of the cut-out and the surroundings it inhabits seem plausible 
enough for the viewer to look at the artwork with a perceptual shorthand and see a 
living person rather than an image. The general shape of the body within the image 
and the activities it enacts are quickly summarised by the eye and mind into a woman 
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engaged in an embrace. There is an assumption that the man and woman posed 
together before the lens, then the shutter was released and the image was recorded. 
In Camera Lucida Barthes describes photographs as “a superimposition…of reality and 
of the past”,10 because they don't only refer to the object they depict, they also show 
the moment in time when the shutter was released. Cameras may capture moments 
of the present but photographs are always images of the past, things that have already 
happened. Artworks in this book contain a montage of two separate events; the 
photographing of the cut-out itself and the re-photographing of the cut-out in the 
scene. Both the male and the female subject really posed before the lens, but not at 
the same time. I have created a superimposition of reality; of the past and of the past 
again. Because the first event merges undetected into the background of the second 
event, illusion of the reality of the photograph's origin is upheld in the first instance of 
looking. When the viewer has time to look at the image more closely the brain is able 
to flip from body hypothesis to cut-out hypothesis as the tell tale signs of the paper 
are revealed and the illusion disintegrates. 
 
Like Parrhasius' painting of the curtain, my photographs offer the viewer a plausible 
version of reality. Because the image is photographic there is an expectation of a 
single moment of time caught on film. The action of the scene implies animation; it 
suggests that both figures were in motion when the shutter was released and would 
continue in that trajectory once it had closed. This is the work of the brain too, 
because limited visual data is used to build a narrative - filling in temporal space as 
well as absent physical dimensions. Merleau-Ponty’s translucent object is intersected 
by an infinite number of present moments in time as well as angles of perception. If 
my cut-outs can prevent the infinite number of present scrutinies by revealing their 
material form and making themselves incomprehensible as three-dimensional objects, 
they can also create a temporal block in the mind of the viewer. If the gestures of the 
cut-out and male subject are not believable then the narrative of the gesture would be 
disrupted and the stillness of the image would suggest a body without vitality, rather 
than a moment of action suspended in time. In the 1990s Georges Didi-Huberman 
wrote Confronting Images, in which he argued that Renaissance statues were doomed 
to contain this lack of vitality because of their “cadaverous rigidity, the closed eyes, all 
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this obliges the affecting face henceforth to resemble only its most exact, impersonal, 
and dramatic resemblance - its resemblance to being dead”.11 If the statue does not 
suggest life and sentience, it will always resemble a death mask. 
 
The life-like resemblances of photographic portraiture are not safe-guarded from 
death either; Barthes described how a photograph could embalm his features, calling 
the experience of being photographed a “micro-version of death”. He recounts how 
successive photographers asked him to enact all sorts of gestures of living in order to 
keep the quality of the memento mori from his features.12 The figures contained in the 
artworks in this book are arranged to pose using gestures in this way, so that the 
audience are taken in by the sweep of implied action and fail to spot the unnatural 
stillness that resides in the female. In some of the photographs in Interloper the cut-
outs are purposefully presented in a lifeless pose. This significantly reduces the 
expectation of the viewer – they no longer expect movement to follow the moment of 




The Other Side of the Power of Looking 
We pose for the camera, not because we are aware of the dangers of its ‘embalming’ 
quality, but because we feel represented by the resulting photograph. In reality our 
features are in constant motion but the photograph fixes us in a single form which 
determines who we are for the look of the other. We attempt to idealise our bodies 
for the lens, we turn ourselves into images – objects of sight.  
 
Laura Mulvey describes this in Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema, “women are 
simultaneously looked at and displayed; with their appearance coded for strong visual 
and erotic impact so that they can be said to connote to-be-looked-at-ness… she holds 
the look and plays to a signified male desire”.13 The female body doesn’t need to act, it 
is not at the mercy of the memento mori because it is expected to be passive and 
displayed. It doesn’t require an implied narrative, or sequence of events to give it 
sentience because it is animated by the desire of the observer. When we look at a 
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female body we do not possess an objective view of it; we look at it through the 
screen of sexual codes. 
 
The Dutch genre painters of the seventeenth century coded ostensibly innocent 
domestic scenes with insinuations of sexual promiscuity. Prostitution was subtly 
implied by the way a musical instrument was held, the presence of feathers adorning a 
woman’s hat or an empty oyster shell lying on a table. Understanding the full meaning 
of the ‘Bordeeltjes’ paintings requires an exhaustive inventory of signifiers because the 
images contained many cryptic clues to be solved by the viewer. The use of symbols 
allowed members of respectable society to own and display titillating images of sexual 
promiscuity without causing offence. The paintings proffered themselves as warnings 
against slovenliness and loose morals, acting as a visual chastisement. But in reality 
“[the] point of the symbolism was not to expose sexual behaviour but to shroud it 
behind a gauze of allusions and metaphors”.14 By ascribing everyday objects with 
sexual meaning, the character of the female subject could be indirectly described.  
 
In the Cut to the Measure of Desire performances the language of symbolism in Dutch 
Bordeeltjes painting is used to create scenes of concealed, and yet excessive sexuality. 
Each gesture and prop is carefully chosen to symbolise promiscuity, commerce and 
desire; the codes that surround me as a figure within the artwork, also contextualise 
my body for the audience.   
 
Cultural codes are not limited to pictorial messages hidden in paintings; we are 
surrounded by signs and symbols that we consciously and unconsciously translate. Our 
bodies are canvases we can use to inscribe information about ourselves, but they are 
also objects that are read by society in ways that we can’t control. The social signifiers 
that code our appearance reduce complex individuals to generalised group 
characteristics, and the symbols and gestures that connote desire become the cultural 
codes used to signify normative femininity. “It is through the fantasies produced by 
“artists, artisans, designers of dresses and hats, and creators of imaginary forms in 
general”,15 that certain bodies come to be seen worthier of our libidinal affirmation 
than others”.16 
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Consumer and consumed 
In the early 20th Century Freud wrote an Introduction to Psychoanalysis which 
described how the human mind is driven by unconscious drives that are unknown to 
the individual, but could be interpreted by psychoanalysis. He said that the objects we 
covet are not always linked to rational needs, but to irrational, sexual and egotistical 
desires. Freud’s nephew Edward Bernays saw a potential to exploit the unconscious 
drives and utilise psychoanalysis to effectively market mass-produced goods to the 
American population. People began to buy because of want instead of need. Like the 
symbolic objects in Dutch paintings, commercial products were given significance 
beyond their material attributes. Consumers overestimated the real value of the 
objects because they appealed directly to their unconscious desires. 
 
Attractive women appeared in adverts selling a wide variety of products, and the 
potential to satiate desire was the predominate message. Seemingly sexually available, 
beautiful women suggested to the male consumer what they should buy to attract the 
affections of other beautiful women. At the same time they suggested to the female 
viewer that they should emulate them in order to obtain the desire of men. Consumer 
items became powerful emotional symbols of how individuals wished to be perceived 
by their peers. The advertising industries constructed a closed world around the ideal 
image, creating the icons that fill the role of the feminine ideal, an ideal that men 
desired and women narcissistically wanted to emulate. The advertisers then sold 
products to the consumer population with the promise that they would help them to 
achieve these goals. There is an endless cycle of “women exchanged in image and 
women transforming themselves into image through commodity consumption”.17  
 
The advertisements do not show a specific person but signify a specific desire. The 
generalising ability of idealisation destabilises the specifying nature of the 
photographic image; it loosens the relationship between the photograph and its 
referent because the images no longer represent the actual body but a generic, 
desired body. The human body as a tangible object gives way to the female body as a 
visible object that is not endowed with the attributes of a whole sentient being but is 
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reduced to a fragment. The female body is a sign, a visual surface that suggests sexual 
possibility.  
 
Regardless of the medium of communication, women are coded to signify male desire 
and the sexual messages are built up using commodities. In seventeenth century art, 
subtle inferences were created by the inclusion of accepted symbols. The symbols 
could be objects, such as a string of onions (a known aphrodisiac) or a plucked bird (a 
visual pun on a slang term for sex). They could also take the form of a sexually 
suggestive gesture like a man pressing his thumb into the bowl of a pipe. Sexual 
innuendo within contemporary visual culture is overt, but still manifested through 
objects and gestures. The stiletto shoe and female body are equally objectified and 
sexualised; they are interchangeable and signify the same desire. If Bordeeltjes 
paintings are subtle riddles with precise messages to be deciphered by a 
knowledgeable viewer, contemporary advertising is another type of perception 
shorthand – a simple abbreviated sign that points directly to a complex web of 
unconscious desire and cultural, sexual stereotype. They are simple object-
associations that shout 'sex' at the observer and then allow them to imagine the 
diversity of activity that they intimate. They are signs that direct the observer to their 
own specific, personal fantasies. Our signifiers communicate on a conscious level, but 
also appeal to the audiences’ unconscious desires. The pervasive nature of the 
message is irresistible and inescapable. 
 
In the photographic series Visual Pleasure, I adorn myself in the superficial trappings of 
femininity; a costume that functions to emphasise my sexuality while concealing it 
behind an artificial façade. I am not a photographic copy in this work but the 
construction of my appearance renders me artificial. I lose my individuality in the 
images and become a generic female instead. Despite appearing ‘in the flesh’ I am still 
the visible object, I have transformed myself into an image through commodity. The 
stereotypical facets of femininity – the stilettos, long hair and red nails – overload my 
image with sexual symbols, creating an object of desire that is excessive in its display. 
My body seems unable to bear the weight of its visualness and my appearance 
becomes grotesque, demonstrating what Silverman called “the impasse at the heart of 
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traditional femininity: the impossibility of approximating the images in relation to 
which one is constantly and inflexibly judged”.18   
 
In the photographs my whole body is not visible; it appears to have been fragmented 
into sexual signifiers, fetishized body parts endowed with the ability to satiate desire. 
In Freudian psychoanalysis the need to create a fetish object is based in castration 
anxiety; the love object seems to have been castrated, so the fetishist must create a 
penis for her. The penis substitute could take any form, from a high heeled shoe to a 
body part or a hair colour. There is an overvaluation of the chosen object – it is raised 
from an inanimate object into a sexually gratifying replacement for the real person 
they desire. A photograph of a female body also encourages overvaluation; it invites 
the viewer to bestow all the characteristics of a sentient being onto its two-
dimensional surface. The mind of the viewer adds information and re-inflates the lost 
dimensions of the body to create the fantasy of a present female form. The female 
body doesn’t have to be actively constituted in the way Barthes described because the 
desire of the observer animates the body and gives it life. 
 
The idea of fetishism has become synonymous with the use of non-sexual objects for 
sexual gratification as described by Freud, but it also has other cultural connotations. 
Marx outlined a theory of commodity fetishism, in which the values of objects are 
socially constructed and not inherent within the objects themselves. The items we 
treasure most are not particularly valuable to us socially, but have been elevated 
through the artificial value system of capitalism. The theory suggests that if the 
hierarchy of value was based on the objects ability to address our needs, things that 
help us live would be highly prized and things with little functional use would be seen 
as valueless. Although fuel, agriculture and water supply can create wealth, our 
symbols of wealth tend to be the purely decorative – gold, diamonds, ornate 
architecture and fine art. Capitalism, the advertising world and our unconscious 
desires collude to promote functionless objects to desirable status symbols.  
 
In both types of fetishism there is an overvaluation of the object; in one the object is 
wrongly deemed to be sexually satisfying, in the other its financial price overvalues its 
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cultural worth. The culturally accepted image of femininity transforms its chosen 
inanimate objects into sexual objects and their functional attributes are subordinated 
to their decorative appeal. It is stereotypically defined by shoes that can be 
uncomfortable to walk in, clothes that restrict the body and long nails that could 
impede simple tasks. The photographic image accentuates the fetishisation of the 
female body, as it removes the womans sentience and emphasises her erotically 
coded visible surface. Capitalistic drives and unconscious desire coalesce to create the 
illusion of sexual gratification through the purchase of commodities.  
 
The Eye of the Beholder 
Theorists often describe a neutral process of looking that isn't influenced by prejudice 
or desire; a viewing position that sees the world without knowledge or emotion to 
colour the observers opinion. In this process the raw data of the external world is 
collected without interpreting it or hypothesising about what is missing. But the 
innocent eye is a fallacy because everything we see is constructed by the culture we 
reside in, and is deciphered by the mind that perceives it.  
 
Our minds complete what our eyes cannot because visual information alone is 
inadequate and presents us with an incomprehensible world. It is because of the gaps 
in our perception of the external world that we are able to project ourselves into it 
and actively engage in the visible realm. According to Lacan we enter into the visible 
world in early childhood, through a process he called the Mirror Phase. Prior to the 
Mirror phase babies comprehend their bodies as fragments that are indistinguishable 
from the external world. During early infancy the child sees an image of itself, either in 
a mirror or through identification with another child. Although it does not recognise 
the image as itself, the completeness of the external body helps it to master the 
fragments of its own body.19  
 
From that moment the boundary between inner self and external reality is permeable 
and blurred. We internalise the world through tactile sensations and then project our 
knowledge back out onto the objects we apprehend; our ability to decipher the 
symbolic codes of our visual culture adds a richness of meaning to what we see. We 
Dawn Woolley, 2010. 
also absorb social attributes, ideals and prejudices which we perform for others and 
project onto their bodies. We are visible objects for those around us and the powers of 
interpretation that we use to create meaning on the bodies of others is also used on 
our own visible surfaces to assume, hypothesise, sexualise, fetishize and objectify. 
 
The homogenization of mental process and visual information is continuous. Vision is a 
process of reception and projection, and it is impossible to separate one type of 
information from the other. We will never be able to distinguish the actual from the 
inferred; as Hume suggests, “we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can 
conceive any kind of existence but those perceptions that have appeared in that 
narrow compass. This is the universe of the imagination, nor have we any idea but 
what is there produced”.20 
 
Photographic representations seem to offer us something akin to the innocent eye; 
they are images created by a mechanical recording device that is unbiased in the way 
it democratically reduces all objects to a two-dimensional surface. The camera, 
however, shows us more than the eye is capable of seeing. Rather than objectively 
depicting our bodies, it accentuates our visibleness. The camera is synonymous with 
what Foucault described as “the normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible 
to qualify, to classify and to punish. It establishes over individuals a visibility through 
which one differentiates and judges them”.21 The body is a ‘translucent object’ for 
societal scrutiny. It is trapped within the panoptican, a prison in which it is always 
visible, although not necessarily always watched. This is the state of perpetual 
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